EDITOR'S CORNER: Is Russia Preparing for Another Mobilisation?
There are growing rumours that Russia is preparing for another round of forced mobilisation. If it happens, it is likely to take place in the autumn, after the Kremlin's state elections. In the meantime, the government appears to be laying the groundwork by introducing new laws that further restrict citizens' freedom of movement and expand the state's ability to monitor and control the population. Taken together, these measures point towards a level of state oversight that rivals and in some respects may even exceed that of the Soviet era.
In this blog post, I will examine how realistic another large scale mobilisation is, the challenges Russia would face in carrying it out, and the potential consequences such a move could have for the country.
Russia's partial mobilisation in September 2022 provides the clearest indication of what another large scale mobilisation could look like. The Kremlin announced that it would call up 300,000 reservists, although the exact number ultimately mobilised cannot be independently verified. The announcement triggered a wave of emigration, with hundreds of thousands of people leaving the country in the following weeks to avoid conscription.
The mobilisation had consequences that extended far beyond the battlefield. It disrupted businesses, deepened labour shortages, and increased uncertainty throughout the economy. Russia was already facing demographic challenges, and the departure of many working age men further reduced the available labour force. At the same time, the mobilisation highlighted the political risks of forcing large numbers of people into military service, as public anxiety and dissatisfaction became more visible than at any point since the full scale invasion began.
If the Kremlin orders another wave of mobilisation in 2026, it will almost certainly seek to prevent a repeat of the mass emigration that followed the 2022 announcement. Since then, the Russian government has introduced a series of measures that make it more difficult for people to evade conscription or leave the country. The expansion of digital military records, electronic draft notices, and tighter administrative controls has strengthened the state's ability to monitor eligible recruits and restrict their movements. Taken together, these measures suggest that the Kremlin has learned from the shortcomings of the 2022 mobilisation and is attempting to reduce the political and economic disruption that accompanied it.
DO RUSSIANS HAVE THE APPETITE FOR IT?
Although the Kremlin has spent the past several years building the legal and administrative infrastructure needed to carry out another mobilisation and make it more difficult for people to leave the country, that does not necessarily mean the public will accept it without resistance. Another large scale mobilisation would likely generate significant public anger, particularly if it affects people who have so far avoided military service. The Russian parliament has also passed numerous laws that strengthen the state's ability to suppress dissent and punish anti war activism. Even so, repression cannot eliminate public opposition entirely. For many Russians, the prospect of arrest or a prison sentence may still appear less frightening than being sent to fight on the front.
Another factor is who would be mobilised. During the 2022 mobilisation, critics argued that the burden fell disproportionately on poorer regions and ethnic minority communities, while residents of Moscow and St Petersburg were less affected. If Russia requires significantly more manpower, maintaining those disparities may become increasingly difficult. A broader mobilisation could therefore affect larger numbers of people in Russia's biggest cities, bringing the realities of the war closer to populations that have previously been relatively insulated from its direct consequences. At the same time, Ukrainian long range drone strikes have become more frequent and now reach targets deep inside Russia, reinforcing the sense that the war is no longer confined to distant front lines.
CAN RUSSIA AFFORD IT?
Another important question is whether Russia can afford another large scale mobilisation. While wartime spending has supported economic activity by driving investment in the defence sector and increasing industrial production, it has also placed enormous strain on public finances. At the same time, Russia continues to face pressure from sanctions, Ukrainian strikes on parts of its energy infrastructure, and lower revenues from oil exports as global prices fluctuate. Combined with persistent labour shortages, these factors raise questions about how sustainable the current wartime economy will be over the long term.
The war has also imposed a heavy demographic and economic cost. Hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the full scale invasion began, removing a significant number of working age men from both the military and civilian workforce. Together with the emigration that followed the 2022 mobilisation and Russia's long standing demographic decline, this has made it increasingly difficult for employers to fill vacancies across many sectors of the economy.
Russia's defence industry has expanded rapidly to meet the demands of the war, with factories operating around the clock to produce ammunition, missiles, drones, and armoured vehicles. However, maintaining this level of production indefinitely will become increasingly expensive. If the war continues for several more years and Russia decides to mobilise substantially more personnel, the Kremlin may have little choice but to shift even more of the economy onto a wartime footing. That would require directing a growing share of national resources toward defence spending, potentially at the expense of infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other civilian priorities.
Such a shift would present the Kremlin with a difficult balancing act. Higher military spending may allow Russia to sustain the war effort, but it also risks fuelling inflation, widening labour shortages, and slowing long term economic growth. The longer the war continues, the more difficult it will become to maintain both military production and living standards without imposing additional sacrifices on the Russian population.
WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS ON EUROPE?
Another large scale Russian mobilisation would have important consequences for Europe. The most immediate effect would be the continuation of a long war in Ukraine, requiring European countries to sustain military, financial, and humanitarian support for Kyiv. NATO members would also face increased pressure to expand defence spending, strengthen their armed forces, and accelerate the production of ammunition and military equipment to maintain credible deterrence along the alliance's eastern flank.
A mobilisation of between 300,000 and 500,000 additional personnel, which is the range most frequently discussed by analysts and Ukrainian officials, would also signal that the Kremlin is preparing for a prolonged conflict rather than a negotiated settlement. Beyond the battlefield, Europe would likely face an increase in cyber attacks, sabotage, and disinformation campaigns as Russia seeks to exert pressure on Western governments while continuing its military campaign in Ukraine.
There is also speculation that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with a NATO country. Although this remains a low probability scenario, it is one that is taken seriously in European defence circles. As a result, Europe should continue to strengthen its military capabilities and readiness.
Whether or not such a conflict ever materialises, maintaining a strong deterrent is the best way to prevent one. Preparing for the worst is ultimately far less costly than being unprepared.
MY OPINION
I believe Russia may struggle to sustain another large scale mobilisation, not only because of its economic costs but also because of its demographic and political consequences. The Russian population has shown a willingness to endure significant hardship, but there are limits to how much strain society can absorb before public discontent becomes more difficult to manage. Another mobilisation would test those limits, particularly if it reaches deeper into Russia's major cities and affects groups that have so far been less exposed to the war.
At the same time, the Kremlin may conclude that it cannot afford not to mobilise. The war in Ukraine continues to impose heavy costs on Russia's military, economy, and energy sector. Sustaining offensive operations while replacing battlefield losses requires a steady flow of personnel, and volunteer recruitment alone may eventually prove insufficient. This leaves the Kremlin facing a difficult dilemma, with neither option carrying an obvious advantage.
It is therefore likely that the Russian leadership is considering a range of options to regain the initiative on the battlefield. The front in eastern Ukraine has become increasingly characterised by slow, incremental advances achieved at a high human and material cost. If the Kremlin concludes that the current approach cannot deliver its strategic objectives, it may decide that a broader mobilisation, despite its political and economic risks, is necessary to generate the additional combat power needed to break the deadlock. Whether that calculation proves correct is another matter entirely.
CONCLUSION
Another Russian mobilisation remains a realistic possibility, but it would come at a significant political, economic, and demographic cost. Although the Kremlin has strengthened its ability to control the population since 2022, mobilising hundreds of thousands of additional people would place further strain on an already pressured economy and society.
Ultimately, the Kremlin faces a difficult choice. It may need more manpower to sustain the war in Ukraine, but another mobilisation could create problems at home that are just as difficult to manage as those on the battlefield.
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