EDITOR'S CORNER: Winter at War in Ukraine

As we roll into September, temperatures are cooling, the rains are coming, and Ukraine is facing the prospect of another difficult winter. Russia's war of terror is still raging and becoming increasingly violent.

In this week's blog, I want to look at what kind of winter Ukraine may face and the challenges ahead. Europe and NATO also need to be aware, as the hybrid threat continues to grow stronger.

(Copyright: Wikipedia Commons, dsns.gov.ua)

BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DRONE STRIKES

During the summer, Russia has made some limited territorial gains, but it has not achieved a major breakthrough on the battlefield. Ukraine has also struggled to make significant territorial gains. Much of the fighting has increasingly moved beyond the front line, with both sides relying heavily on long-range strikes.

Ukraine has expanded its campaign of long-range drone strikes against targets inside Russia, including oil refineries, military depots and other parts of Russia's military and energy infrastructure. Russia, meanwhile, continues to launch missiles and drones against Ukraine, striking cities and critical infrastructure and killing civilians.

While Ukraine appears to have a more long-term strategy focused on weakening Russia's ability to sustain the war, Russia continues to put pressure on the Ukrainian population by targeting the infrastructure people depend on every day.

Because of this growing threat, President Zelenskyy has repeatedly discussed Ukraine's need for more air defence. Among the most important systems are Patriot batteries and interceptors, which are among Ukraine's most capable defences against ballistic missiles and other high-end aerial threats.

The problem is that Ukraine needs more than just the systems themselves. It needs a steady supply of interceptors to keep them operating. Patriot missiles are expensive and in short supply, making international support increasingly important.

Money is also a major concern. Ukraine continues to lobby its allies for funding to strengthen infrastructure, purchase weapons and prepare for another winter under attack.

WINTER IN 2026

The winter of 2025 to 2026 demonstrated how vulnerable Ukraine remains when Russia targets its energy infrastructure. Repeated strikes placed enormous pressure on electricity and heating systems, forcing Ukrainians to endure prolonged disruptions during some of the coldest months of the year.

Now, as we approach the later part of 2026, many Ukrainians fear that Russia could intensify its attacks during the coming winter. The concern is not only about electricity. Russia could target the wider network of infrastructure that Ukraine needs to keep its population alive and functioning.

This could mean more frequent strikes against energy infrastructure and potentially against water infrastructure as well. It might be possible to live without electricity for some time, especially with generators and other backup systems. However, living for long periods without a reliable water supply is far more difficult.

The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in 2023 demonstrated just how devastating damage to major water infrastructure can be. The breach caused catastrophic flooding and created serious problems for drinking water, agriculture and the environment.

Ukraine is preparing for the winter. It has been building up natural-gas reserves and working to strengthen critical infrastructure. But no amount of preparation can completely eliminate the vulnerability of a country whose energy network remains under sustained missile and drone attack.

CAN THIS DISASTER BE PREVENTED?

One of the most important ways Ukraine can reduce civilian casualties this winter is by strengthening its air-defence network.

This means more Patriot systems and interceptors, but also stronger protection against drones, electronic warfare capabilities, shelters and more resilient energy infrastructure.

Ukraine has demonstrated an impressive ability to intercept large numbers of Russian drones and cruise missiles. However, ballistic missiles remain a much more difficult challenge, particularly when Russia launches large numbers of them simultaneously.

The scale of the ballistic-missile threat has changed significantly. Russia launched at least 126 ballistic missiles at Ukraine in July alone, according to analysis of Ukrainian Air Force data. That was a wartime monthly record.

Ballistic missiles travel at extreme speeds and are among the most difficult threats to intercept. This is precisely why Patriot systems are so important.

European allies need to pull together and contribute to Ukraine's needs. I understand that many people are becoming extremely tired of the cost of the war. The financial burden is enormous, and there is no easy solution.

However, Europe also has to consider the cost of doing nothing.

Supporting Ukraine is not only about helping Ukraine survive. It is also about reducing the risk that Russia's aggression expands further into Europe.

MY OPINION

Russia is becoming increasingly aggressive in its hybrid activities against European countries and NATO members. These activities can include sabotage, cyberattacks, espionage, disinformation and other forms of pressure designed to create instability and fear.

At the same time, it is important to recognise that hybrid activity is not the same as open war. NATO has said that it does not currently see an imminent threat of a direct Russian attack on the alliance. But that does not mean that Europe is facing no threat at all.

The security environment is clearly changing.

The recent developments across Europe are concerning: the CIA director's secretive visit to Moscow, investigations into suspected sabotage, threats against European countries, and repeated incidents involving drones entering the airspace of NATO members.

Romania, for example, has experienced drone incursions connected to Russia's war against Ukraine. Poland and other NATO countries have also had to respond to increasingly serious airspace incidents.

Taken together, these events demonstrate how tense the European security environment has become.

For NATO countries, investing in Ukraine also means investing in our future defence. Every missile intercepted over Ukraine is a missile that does not reach its intended target. Every Russian military capability destroyed in Ukraine is one that cannot be used against another country.

Europe is not immune to the difficult winter ahead. European countries have already faced suspected sabotage and other forms of Russian hybrid activity. We cannot assume that these activities will remain limited.

We need to draw a line in the sand and make sure that democracy is the winner.

CONCLUSION

Ukraine faces another tough winter, and the months ahead may be even harder than the last. They will continue to depend on its allies, and those allies need to continue providing assistance, weapons, air defence and financial support. Right now, we stand in a geopolitical balance. Europe is not at war with Russia, but we are not at peace either.

This state in between can be extremely confusing, dangerous and expensive — both in terms of lives and money. The question is no longer simply how Ukraine survives another winter. The question is whether Europe is prepared to make sure that Ukraine does not have to face it alone.